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WHERE THE HEART IS:
AMENDING THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS
ACT TO PROVIDE WAGE AND OVERTIME
PAY PROTECTION TO AGENCY-EMPLOYED
HOME HEALTH AIDES
ELIZABETH RIORDANt
INTRODUCTION
In June 2009, fifteen Senators, led by Senator Tom Harkin,
sent a letter to U.S. Department of Labor ("DOL") Secretary
Hilda Solis urging the DOL to interpret the Fair Labor
Standards Act to extend wage and hour protection to America's
home health care workers.' The Senators' letter voiced the plight
of approximately one million home health aides2 whose claim to
unpaid wages and overtime pay has made its way to the Supreme
Court by an unlikely champion: Evelyn Coke. Ms. Coke was a
mother of five who worked as a home health aide for more than
two decades. Although she often worked more than seventy
hours a week, she never received a penny of overtime pay.'
Under existing federal law, she had no right to.
t Senior Staff, St. John's Law Review, J.D. Candidate, 2011, St. John's University
School of Law; B.A., History, Art History, 2006, Loyola University of Maryland. I
would like to thank Professor Lawrence Joseph, who served as my advisor in writing
this Note, and Professors Ann Goldweber and Gina Calabrese of the Elder Law
Clinic.
I See Letter from Tom Harkin, U.S. Sen., et al., to Hilda Solis, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't
of Labor (June 11, 2009) (on file with author), available at http://harkin.senate.gov/
press/release.cfin?i=314345.
2 Estimates put the number of home health aides at around 955,200.
Occupational Employment Statistics, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, http://www.bls.gov/oes/2009/may/oes31011.htm (last modified May 14,
2010).
' Douglas Martin, Evelyn Coke, 74, Dies; Home Care Aide Fought Pay Rule, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 10, 2009, at A18.
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While the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") extends broad
minimum wage and overtime pay protections to millions of low-
wage workers,' a 1974 amendment that extended protection to
domestic employees simultaneously carved out an exception for
certain types of employees under the "companionship
exemption."5 With this exemption, Congress intended to exclude
casual babysitters and "companions," essentially elder sitters,
from wage and hour law protections in light of the ad hoc nature
of these employment relationships. Today, despite the bona fide
employment status of home health aides employed by third party
agencies,' the DOL has deemed these employees "companions"
within the companionship exemption.' Under this third party
rule, agency-employed home health aides have no claim to
overtime pay, regardless of the size or sophistication of their
employer. When faced with Ms. Coke's challenge to the third
party rule in Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, the
Supreme Court deferred to the DOL's rulemaking authority,
essentially punting the issue to Congress.' As a result, home
health aides-at the heart of one of the fastest growing segments
of the direct care industry-remain among the ranks of its lowest
paid.'
This Note argues that Congress must amend the
companionship exemption to extend minimum wage protection
and overtime pay to home health aides employed by third party
agencies if the direct care industry is to accommodate America's
growing senior population. To avoid burdening patients with
increased costs of care, Congress should include an
' See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 202 (2006).
6 See id. § 213(a)(15). FLSA protections shall not apply to "any employee
employed on a casual basis in domestic service employment to provide babysitting
services or any employee employed in domestic service employment to provide
companionship services for individuals who (because of age or infirmity) are unable
to care for themselves . . . ." Id. (emphasis added).
6 It should be noted that a significant amount of home health aides are
employed by private individuals and are not affiliated with third party agencies. See
infra note 61. Arguably, these aides are similarly deserving of wage and hour
protections. However, in light of the logistical difficulties in regulating these types of
employment relationships and the fact that third party employment more readily
fits within the scope of formal employment as defined by courts, the reach of this
Note is limited to agency-employed home health aides. See infra notes 63-66 and
accompanying text.
' See 29 C.F.R. § 552.109(a) (2011).
8 551 U.S. 158, 174 (2007).
* See infra note 147 and accompanying text.
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accompanying tax-incentive to third party agencies whose
compliance is mandated. Building on existing scholarshipO
concerning the disparity between Congress's conception of an
exempt "companion" and the contemporary home health aide, as
well as the need for alternate legislation, this Note examines
both Coke and proposed legislation to bring home health aides
within the scope of the FLSA. Ultimately, this Note endeavors to
address the practical problems inherent in past and current
legislative proposals and to offer a plan to extend FLSA
protections to agency-employed home health aides without
projecting increased costs onto consumers.
Part I of this Note explores the increasing demand for long-
term senior care services and the vital role of home health aides
within the direct care industry. Part I also examines the 1974
amendment to the FLSA that created the companionship
exemption and illustrates that in using the term "companion"
Congress did not intend to exclude workers formally employed by
private, for-profit agencies." Part II explores litigation
surrounding the companionship exemption, and, in particular,
courts' unfavorable treatment of home health aides' claims for
overtime pay. Part II also examines the DOL's third party rule,
which extends the companionship exemption to home health
aides employed by third party agencies, and the Supreme Court's
deference to the rule in Coke. Part II argues that in light of Coke
and the crisis the companionship exemption poses to quality
senior care, Congress should amend the exemption to bring the
FLSA in line with its original intent.
Part III examines potential legislative responses to Coke and
argues that the proposed 2007 Fair Home Health Care Act is the
best option for extending wage and overtime protection to home
health aides. Part III seeks to make the Act an affordable option
by proposing an accompanying tax-incentive aimed at home
health agencies, which will offset a percentage of an agency's
wage expenditures per employee. This solution: (1) restores a
federal cause of action for home health aides employed by third
party agencies; (2) allows increased costs to be absorbed by
agencies rather than consumers, who in turn rely on already
"0 See Molly Biklen, Healthcare in the Home: Reexamining the Companionship
Services Exemption to the Fair Labor Standards Act, 35 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
113 (2003).
n See 119 CONG. REC. 24,801-92 (1973).
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burdened Medicare and Medicaid systems; and (3) will attract
new and competent workers to the home health profession
thereby increasing access to quality, affordable senior care and
meeting the demand of America's booming senior population.
Indeed, the Fair Home Health Care Act is not only imperative to
ensuring quality long-term care but a necessary and overdue
affirmation of the dignity of home health care workers and the
people they serve.
I. HOME HEALTH CARE, THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT,
AND A LEGACY OF EXCLUSION
A. Scope of the Home Health Care Industry
With an aging baby-boomer population and "increases in life
expectancy and medical advances that allow individuals with
chronic conditions to live longer, "12 the need for long-term care
services is increasing rapidly.'" "Between 2003 and 2030, the
percentage of people in the United States aged [sixty-five] and
older is expected to increase from [twelve] percent of the total
population to [twenty] percent."14 Furthermore, the number of
Americans age eighty-five and older-those most likely to need
personal care services-is projected to more than double, from 4.3
million to 8.9 million."' Care giving for those within this group is
an issue that touches millions of American households: "Nearly
one out of every four . .. households provides care to a relative or
friend aged [fifty] or older and about [fifteen] percent of adults
care for a seriously ill or disabled family member. "1
12 See H.R. 3582, The Fair Home Healthcare Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Workforce Protections of the H. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 110th Cong. 32 (2007)
[hereinafter Hearing], available at http://www.directcareclearinghouse.org/
download/Seavey%20Written%20Statement%20FINAL%200ct%2007.pdf (statement
of Dorie Seavey, Director of Policy Research, Paraprofessional Healthcare Institute).
13 Id.
1 PEGGIE SMITH, DIRECT CARE ALLIANCE, INC., DIRECT CARE ALLIANCE POLICY
BRIEF NO. 2: PROTECTING HOME CARE WORKERS UNDER THE FAIR LABOR
STANDARDS ACT 3-4 (2009) (citing WAHN HE ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., 65+ IN THE UNITED STATES: 2005, at 1 (2005)), available at
http://blog.directcarealliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/06/6709-dca-policybrief
2final.pdf.
" See BERNADETTE WRIGHT, DIRECT CARE WORKERS IN LONG-TERM CARE 3
(2005), available at http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/il/ddl17_workers.pdf (projection
based on 2000-2030).
16 See Hearing, supra note 12 (statement of Dorie Seavey).
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WHERE THE HEART IS
A shift in cultural attitudes and federal policy away from
institutionalization toward home health care services has placed
home health aides in high demand." In recent years, the federal
government has implemented formal efforts toward
" 'rebalancing'. . . the expansion of home-and community-
based services relative to those provided in institutional settings,
such as nursing homes. ... "'I Under The Older Americans Act,"
the federal government has provided funding to support states'
rebalancing programs to "[dlivert people from nursing homes" by
using Medicaid funds to support "[c]onsumer-directed models of
service delivery that enable a person receiving ... [funds]
to . . . hire [a person] of their choice" and enter community-based
long-term care programs or receive at-home care.20 States'
reports indicate the success of rebalancing measures, as the
number of nursing home residents has declined in favor of at-
home care. 21  The distribution of health care workers between
private residences and institutional facilities reflects the impact
of "rebalancing" and the increased demand for home health aides.
"[N]ationally there are now more [home health] aides providing
supports and services in people's homes . .. than in nursing care
" See id.
18 Id. at 26.
1 See 42 U.S.C. § 3058 (2006). The 2006 amendments to the Older Americans
Act codified "rebalancing" initiatives by "embedding the principles of consumer
information for long-term care planning, evidence based prevention programs, and
self-directed community based services to older individuals at risk of
institutionalization." DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN. ON AGING,
HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF PROGRAMS FOR OLDER AMERICANS, http://www.aoa.gov/
AOARoot/AoAPrograms/OAA/resources/History.aspx (last modified Apr. 14, 2011);
see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 3012(b), (b)(6) (West 2011).
20 See NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, A Guide to Long-Term Care
for State Policy Makers: Recent State Initiatives in Rebalancing Long-Term Care,
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=14482 (last visited July 1, 2011).
21 In Connecticut, the number of non-institutionalized disabled persons age
sixty-five and over is projected to increase by sixty-three percent (98,518 individuals)
between 2005 and 2025. JULIE ROBISON ET AL., UNIV. CONN. HEALTH CTR.,
CONNECTICUT LONG-TERM CARE NEEDS ASSESSMENT, PART II: REBALANCING LONG-
TERM CARE SYSTEMS IN CONNECTICUT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2 (2007), available
at http://www.cga.ct.govcoa/PDFs/Rebalancing%20report%20FINAL%20June%2025
%2007.pdf. New Jersey reports that "[firom FY 1997 to FY 2002, the number of
people on Medicaid in nursing homes dropped by more than 3,000, a [ten] percent
reduction" the state attributed to increased funding for at-home and community
long-term care. SUSAN C. REINHARD & CHARLES J. FAHEY, MILBANK MEMORIAL
FUND, REBALANCING LONG-TERM CARE IN NEW JERSEY: FROM INSTITUTIONAL
TOWARD HOME AND COMMUNITY CARE 21 (2003), available at http://www.milbank.
org/reports/030314newjersey/RebalancingMech.pdf.
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facilities ... ."22 Moreover, the DOL projected a fifty percent
increase in the number of home health aides between 2008 and
2018. In short, home health care is a rapidly expanding sector
the direct care industry.24
The breadth of work performed by home health aides has
made it possible for this shift to occur, enabling thousands of
elderly and infirm individuals to remain in the comfort of their
homes while they receive critical care that otherwise might only
be available to them within the confines of a full-time nursing
care facility. 25 Home health aides' daily tasks include taking a
patient's temperature, pulse rate, respiration rate or biood
pressure; helping patients get in and out of bed; changing
medical dressings; assisting with braces and artificial limbs;
assisting with other medical equipment such as ventilators; as
well as administering medications; observing and reporting
changes in medical condition; providing oversight for people with
cognitive and mental impairments;26 and assisting with toileting
functions such as administering catheters." Additionally, many
home health aides perform personal care tasks including cooking,
doing laundry, bathing, feeding, and dressing clients.28 This
broad scope of care provides a lifeline for homebound and limited-
mobility seniors, and effectuates the government's stated
preference for at-home versus institutionalized long-term care.
22 Hearing, supra note 12, at 29 (statement of Dorie Seavey) (explaining that
there are 826,802 home health aides versus 782,948 aides employed in nursing
homes).
23 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL
OUTLOOK HANDBOOK: HOME HEALTH AIDES AND PERSONAL AND HOME CARE AIDES
2 (2010-11 ed.) [hereinafter OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK], available at
http://www.bls.gov/oco/pdflocos326.pdf.
24 See id.
25 Id. at 1-2.
26 See id. at 1; WRIGHT, supra note 15, at 1.
21 OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK, supra note 23; see, e.g., Cox v. Acme
Health Servs., 55 F.3d 1304, 1310 (7th Cir. 1995).
28 OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK, supra note 23, at 1.
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B. Exclusion of Home Health Aides Under the Fair Labor
Standards Act's Companionship Exemption
1. Enactment and Scope of the FLSA
A "cornerstone of the New Deal,"2 9 the FLSA was enacted in
1938 as a broad remedial measure to eliminate "labor conditions
detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of
living necessary for [the] health, efficiency, and general well-
being of workers . .. ."3 Toward this end, the Act not only
established a federal minimum wage but provided overtime
protection, requiring that "employee [s] receive [ I compensation
for . .. employment in excess of... [forty hours a week] at a rate
not less than one and one-half times the regular rate."3 1
These FLSA protections as originally adopted, however, did
not reach domestic service workers-overwhelmingly comprised
of African Americans and females"-"because of doubt about
whether they were engaged in interstate commerce."33 As
commentators have noted, this "history of exclusion" from federal
minimum wage protection "was a result of the ideological
separation of the private home and workplace, and the 'special'
place of domestic labor within the family."3 4 Home was thought
of "as a separate sphere from the market" 5 and, therefore,
beyond reach of the federal commerce power.3 6  "As the
paradigmatic form of woman's work," one scholar writes, "society
" Biklen, supra note 10, at 113.
3o 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2006).
31 29 U.S.C.A. § 207(a)(1) (West 2011).
32 See Brief for the Urban Justice Center et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent at 2 n.1, Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158 (2007)
(No. 06-593) [hereinafter Brief for the Urban Justice Center] ("By 1940, [sixty]
percent of all black female workers were domestic servants, as compared to only
[ten] percent of all white women workers.").
3 SMITH, supra note 14, at 2; see also Biklen, supra note 10, at 117-21.
1 Biklen, supra note 10, at 114; see Peggie R. Smith, Regulating Paid Household
Work: Class, Gender, Race, and Agendas of Reform, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 851, 853-55
(1999).
3 Biklen, supra note 10, at 118.
36 That this idea persisted is evident in remarks made during the legislative
debates surrounding the 1974 amendment: "[If domestic workers are in interstate
commerce by virtue of the fact that they use vacuum cleaners, then the commerce
power indeed has no limits." 119 CONG. REc. 24,796 (1973) (statement of Sen.
Dominick).
8432011]
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viewed domestic service as easy, stress-free work that required
minimal exertion,"3 and by extension, no legal protection.
Congress sought to correct this categorical and
discriminatory38 exclusion with a 1974 amendment extending
FLSA protections to domestic workers." Debates on the
amendments reverberated with disparate notions of the nature of
domestic labor-characterized on the one hand as women's work
performed out of affection and on the other as an arm's length
employment relationship in need of governmental oversight.
Opponents of the amendment "remind[ed] their fellow legislators
that domestic service was unique in that it was merely a
substitute for, or an addition to, the labor of a housewife."40 This
familial characterization of domestic labor implied a level of
intimacy that defied market regulation." Proponents, in
contrast, argued that the long days, low wages and demeaning
treatment to which domestic employees were subjected were
precisely the type of labor conditions the FLSA was enacted to
address.42 For proponents, "considerations of racial justice and
gender equality were [also] a central theme of their argument for
covering domestic service employees."4 3 The proponents
prevailed, and resulting legislation brought domestic workers
ranging from "cooks, waiters, butlers, valets, maids,
housekeepers, [and] governesses" 44 to "footmen, grooms, and
chauffeurs" 45 and others under the FLSA's protective umbrella.
2. The Companionship Exemption
Despite the triumph that the 1974 amendment symbolized
for many domestic workers, Congress, as a bipartisan
1 Biklen, supra note 10, at 120 (quoting Smith, supra note 34, at 894).
3 See id. at 124-25. "For . .. proponents [of the amendment], this focus on the
modernization of domestic employment was part of a larger movement for civil
rights. At the time of the legislative debates about the FLSA extension, ninety-seven
percent of all domestic employees were women and two-thirds were black." Id. at 124
(footnote omitted).
39 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2006).
4 Biklen, supra note 10, at 120.
" See id. at 114.
4 See id. at 123 n.54.
a Brief for the Urban Justice Center, supra note 32, at 24; see 119 CONG. REC.
24,799 (1973) (statement of Sen. Williams).
" 29 C.F.R. § 552.3 (2011).
45 Id.
[Vol. 85:837844
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compromise,4 withheld wage and overtime protection from some
domestic employees. First, Congress exempted from FLSA
protection "any employee employed on a casual basis .. . to
provide babysitting services."' Here, Congress ensured that
individuals who hire a neighborhood babysitter for an evening
out would not have to comply with federal wage and hour laws.4 8
"[B]abysitters employed on other than a casual basis," 49 however,
would enjoy full protection under the FLSA. This distinction
indicates that Congress did not intend for the exemption to reach
full-time employees50 or those formally engaged in a vocation.51
Second, Congress excluded any person "employed in domestic
service employment to provide companionship services for
individuals who (because of age or infirmity) are unable to care
for themselves."5 2 Like the exemption of neighborhood
babysitters, this companionship exemption was intended to
exclude friends, family or others hired "in a pinch"53 to sit with an
aged or infirm relative.54 In short: "an elder sitter."55
The congressional debates surrounding the companionship
exemption indicate that lawmakers contemplating an "elder
sitter" did not intend to exclude from the FLSA the complex and
varied work of home health aides. For example, the definition of
"companion" proposed by Senator Harrison Williams-Chairman
of the Subcommittee on Labor and Public Welfare and a leading
proponent of wage protections for domestic servants-presumes a
level of informality: "I think we all have ... in mind .. . what a
babysitter is there for-to watch youngsters. 'Companion,' as we
mean it, is in the same role-to be there and to watch an older
person, in a sense."56 As one commentator noted, the correlation
to a babysitter suggests that the companion is an ad hoc
46 See Biklen, supra note 10, at 125-27.
41 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(15) (2006).
a See id.
4 29 C.F.R. § 552.3.
5o See Biklen, supra note 10, at 129.
s" See 119 CONG. REC. 24,801 (1973) (statement of Sen. Burdick).
52 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(15).
63 See 119 CONG. REC. 24,801 (1973) (statement of Sen. Burdick).
54 The companionship exemption would shield from FLSA requirements "people
who ... have an aged father, an aged mother, an infirm father, an infirm mother,
and a neighbor comes in and sits with them." Id.
51 Senator Burdick stated that a companion is, "[iun other words, an elder sitter,"
to which Senator Williams responded, "Exactly." Id.
56 Id.
8452011]
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substitute for the primary caregiver, typically a family member:
"The implication that companions serve a similar function-to
watch older people when the primary caretakers had errands to
run-suggests that the legislators still viewed this as part of a
core family function that did not need to be legitimated.. ..
Thus, the terms "babysitter" and "companion" were not intended
to characterize "regular bread-winners. .. responsible for their
families' support"5 8 or workers who "do[] this as a daily living."5
Nevertheless, home health aides have been considered
"companions" by virtue of DOL regulations defining
" 'companionship services' as "services for the 'fellowship, care,
and protection' of persons who cannot care for themselves"; a
definition "that greatly exceed[s] the essential understanding of a
companion that prevailed in 1974."'0
Unlike the casual and intermittent arrangement envisioned
by Congress, agency-based home health care work constitutes
bona fide employment. Most home health aides are formally
"employed by home healthcare or independent living agencies,
which are often paid through Medicaid and Medicare,"'
consistent with federal and state rebalancing efforts.6 2 These
aides satisfy both tests adopted by courts to determine worker
status as an employee versus an independent contractor: the
common law control test and the economic realities test." The
common law test essentially looks at "the extent of control" the
employer "exercise[ ] over the details of the work."" Even
broader than the common law control test is the economic
realities test, which was adopted by the Supreme Court
" Biklen, supra note 10, at 129.
68 H.R. REP. No. 93-913, at 24 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2811, 2845,
1974 WL 11448.
5 119 CONG REC. 24,801 (1973) (statement of Senator Burdick).
60 SMITH, supra note 14, at 5.
6 Biklen, supra note 10, at 132; see Hearing, supra note 12, at 31-32 (statement
of Dorie Seavey). There is also "an admittedly huge private-pay 'grey market'
operating 'off the books,' where private individuals hire aides on their own" that is
"completely unregulated." Id. at 32.
62 See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
a Peggie R. Smith, Home Sweet Home? Workplace Casualties of Consumer-
Directed Home Care for the Elderly, 21 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 537,
543-44 (2007) [hereinafter Smith, Home Sweet Home?].
6 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958); see Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322-23 (1992) (applying common law of agency to
determination of employee status under Employee Retirement Income Secutity Act).
846 [Vol. 85:837
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specifically for FLSA analyses." The economic realities test asks
whether a worker is dependent on the employer as a matter of
economic realities by looking at several factors in addition to
control, such as the company's power to hire, fire, or modify the
employment condition. In agency-based home health care, "the
agency usually exercises considerable control over the worker."6 7
In fact, court records indicate that agency-employed home health
aides are required to adhere to agency-established procedures
and a plan of care for a particular client and typically work under
the direction of a registered nurse." Given this lack of
professional autonomy and the extent to which the agency is
relied upon as the primary source of livelihood, agency-employed
home health aides constitute bona fide employees.
Moreover, the work of home health aides is highly
demanding. The home health work force is largely full-time,"
with work weeks often exceeding forty hours.70 "Most aides work
with a number of different patients, each job lasting a few hours,
days, or weeks" and often see "multiple patients on the same
day."7 ' Because many patients need care twenty-four hours a
65 See Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 727, 729 (1947); United
States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 713 (1947).
6 See, e.g., Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Assocs., Inc., 603 F.2d 748, 754-55 (9th
Cir. 1979). For a discussion of the specific factors considered in the economic
realities test, as well as the different employment status tests that have been
developed by courts under various labor and employment laws, see generally
Katherine V.W. Stone, Legal Protections for Atypical Employees: Employment Law
for Workers Without Workplaces and Employees Without Employers, 27 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 251 (2006).
67 Smith, Home Sweet Home?, supra note 63, at 544.
' See Cox v. Acme Health Servs., Inc., 55 F.3d 1304, 1306 (7th Cir. 1995);
Anglin v. Maxim Healthcare Servs., Inc., No. 6:08-cv-689-Orl-22DAB, 2009 WL
2473685, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 11, 2009) ("Plaintiff worked under the supervision of
a Registered Nurse to provide medically necessary assistance and personal care to
patients in accordance with the orders of the [patient's] physician and the plan of
care.").
69 "Forty-one percent of personal and home care aides report working year-
round, full-time. Only [sixteen] percent work part-year, part time." Hearing, supra
note 12, at 30 (statement of Dorie Seavey).
1o See, e.g., Cox, 55 F.3d at 1307 (stating that Plaintiff Cox was regularly
employed in excess of forty hours per week); Buckner v. Fla. Habilitation Network,
Inc., 489 F.3d 1151, 1153 (11th Cir. 2007) (declaring that the Appellee, a home
health aide employed by appellant agency, regularly worked in excess of forty hours
per week).
' Home Health Aides and Personal and Home Care Aides, BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos326.htm (last visited
July 1, 2011).
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day, some aides work evenings, nights, weekends, and holidays."
Furthermore, "[o]vertime in this industry is not always
voluntary. Rather it is often due to understaffing [and] worker
shortages . . . ." Adding to an often grueling schedule, work as
an aide can be physically taxing with many hours spent standing,
walking, and lifting or transporting patients.74 The emotional
impact of the work also appears significant: Among all workers
in the United States, personal care workers experience the
highest rates of depression lasting two weeks or longer."
II. HOME HEALTH AIDES IN THE FEDERAL COURT SYSTEM
A. Exceptions to the Companionship Exemption & Pre-Coke
Litigation
In light of the disparity between the realities of the home
health profession and the category of "companion" under which
home health aides have been lumped, aides have turned to courts
for redress. In fact, the companionship exemption has been
among the most litigated aspects of the FLSA. 6 Plaintiffs'
challenges to the companionship exemption typically invoke two
exceptions to the exemption established by DOL regulations: the
"household work" exception and "trained personnel" exception.
Both have proven ineffective as inroads for home health aides to
FLSA protections. A third challenge-of greatest importance to
this Note and discussed in the section below-calls into question
the application of the companionship exemption to home health
aides employed by third party agencies.
1. The Household Work Exception
Under the "household work exception" to the companionship
exemption, home health aides' claims to FLSA protection hinges
on their allocation of time between household chores and direct
client care. A home health aide whose general household work
"exceed [s] [twenty] percent of the total weekly hours worked" will
72 Id.
73 Hearing, supra note 12, at 37 (statement of Dorie Seavey).
71 See id. at 29.
7 Id.
7 Deborah F. Buckman, Validity and Construction of "Domestic Service"
Provisions of Fair Labor Standards Act, 165 A.L.R. FED. 163, § 2[b] (2000).
7" 29 C.F.R. § 552.6 (2011).
78 See Buckman, supra note 76.
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be entitled to minimum wage and overtime so long as the
household work is "incidental" and not "related to the care of the
aged or infirm person." 9 As no precise definition of "general
household work" is provided by the department's regulation,80 it
has been left to courts to determine which. tasks will count
toward the twenty percent threshold.
Courts have had difficulty drawing a precise line between
household work that is "general" as opposed to "related to" client
care, and the ambiguity has favored defendants."' In McCune v.
Oregon Senior Services Division," the Ninth Circuit "affirmed
[the] district court ['s] [finding] that regular dusting or
cleaning .. . would ... [constitute] general household work that
could not exceed twenty percent of the [home health aide's]
time."8 3  "Cleaning a spill by the client," however, "would
be .. . care more related to the individual than to the general
household,"84 and would therefore not count toward the twenty
percent threshold. The scope of related care discussed by the
court in McCune was expanded so broadly in Terwilliger v. Home
of Hope, Inc."* as to render the twenty percent exception virtually
inapplicable to home health aides. In Terwilliger, the court
declared that "mopping and dusting," for example, were related
to a client's care because the client crawled around on the floor;
for another client who was allergic to dust and mold, "[d]usting,
sweeping, mopping[,] and wiping countertops" all constituted
household work related to his care." As one scholar noted, by the
Terwilliger logic, "an employee could perform unlimited
household work for an elderly client and still be under the
companionship services exemption.""
7 29 C.F.R. § 552.6.
80 Id.; see Anglin v. Maxim Healthcare Servs., Inc., No. 6:08-cv-689-Orl-22DAB,
2009 WL 2473685, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 11, 2009).
s' Biklen, supra note 10, at 142-43.
82 894 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1990).
" Biklen, supra note 10, at 143.
*4 McCune v. Or. Senior Servs. Div., 643 F. Supp. 1444, 1450 (D. Or. 1986), affd,
894 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1990).
" Id.; see Biklen, supra note 10, at 143.
86 42 F. Supp. 2d 1231 (N.D. Okla. 1999).
81 Id. at 1238, 1251; see Biklen, supra note 10, at 143-44.
" Biklen, supra note 10, at 144.
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2. The Trained Personnel Exception
Like the household work exception, the trained personnel
exception has proven futile for home health aides seeking a right
to overtime pay through the courts. Under the trained personnel
exception, the companionship exemption does not extend to
services that "require and are performed by trained personnel,
such as a registered or practical nurse."" While the use of the
phrase "such as" would seemingly indicate that nurses are but an
example of such trained personnel, in practice, courts have
limited the exception to those who are actually registered and
licensed practical nurses.o In Cox v. Acme Health Services,
Inc.," for example, the Seventh Circuit rejected the Plaintiffs
argument that the regulation's "use of the phrase 'such
as'. . . left open the possibility that other trained employees [like
the Plaintiffl would also qualify for this exception."92 The court
held that the Plaintiff, who was certified in CPR and had
completed seventy-five hours of home health aide training in
addition to 105 hours of certified nursing assistant training, did
not qualify as trained personnel. The court reasoned that the
"mere seventy-five hours of training [required] to become a home
health aide" was but "a fraction of the training received by
registered or practical nurses."" This reasoning has been
pervasive, with identical conclusions reached in the Fifth,5
Ninth, and Tenth97 Circuits. "Reading literally the regulation's
89 29 C.F.R. § 552.6 (2011).
9o Biklen, supra note 10, at 141; see, e.g., Cox v. Acme Health Servs, Inc., 55 F.3d
1304, 1309-10 (7th Cir. 1995).
91 55 F.3d 1304 (7th Cir. 1995).
92 Id. at 1309 (emphasis omitted).
9 Id. at 1307 & n.5, 1309-10.
" Id. at 1309-10. The court's analysis focused on the hierarchical structure of
direct home health care, finding "[olf particular significance . .. the fact that a home
health aide must be closely supervised by a registered nurse, who is responsible for
providing the home health aide with written instructions for patient care and
making regular supervisory visits to the patient's home." Id. at 1310 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
95 See Cook v. Hays, 212 F. App'x 295, 295-96 (5th Cir. 2006) (affirming the
district court's holding that Plaintiff, who was trained as a radiologist technician but
was not a registered nurse, was not trained personnel).
" See McCune v. Or. Senior Servs. Div., 894 F.2d 1107, 1110 (9th Cir. 1990)
(affirming the district court's holding that Plaintiffs, who were certified nursing
assistants who received sixty hours of formal training, were not trained personnel).
" See Terwilliger v. Home of Hope, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1302-03 (N.D.
Okla. 1998) (holding that Plaintiffs, who had completed 160 hours in basic education
850 [Vol. 85:837
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use of nurses as an example of trained personnel, ... the courts
therefore require that an employee actually be a nurse or have
received training equivalent to that of a nurse to fall within the
'trained personnel' exception."98
Courts' narrow reading of the trained personnel exception as
essentially a nurses' exception is problematic for three reasons.
First, as Judge Pregerson stated in her dissent in McCune, the
court's holding that certified nursing assistants were "not trained
for the purposes of minimum wage coverage smacks of elitism."9
Judge Pregerson's pointed comment is supported by courts'
frequent characterization of home-health-aide plaintiffs' tasks as
"simple,"o00 even where the range of tasks cited in those same
opinions is lengthy and complex. Second, because the FLSA was
enacted as a humanitarian statute intended "to extend the
frontiers of social progress,"'O' courts have almost universally
recognized that exemptions to the FLSA must be narrowly
construed. 102 In fact, as the Supreme Court articulated in A.H.
Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, "[t]o extend an exemption to other than
those plainly and unmistakably within its terms and spirit is to
abuse the interpretative process and to frustrate the announced
will of the people."s0 3  From this principle, as Judge Pregerson
has argued, it follows "that exceptions to the exemptions should
be broadly [interpreted]" in favor of plaintiffs.'0 4 A broader
classes and were required to complete an additional forty hours per year, were not
trained personnel).
* Buckman, supra note 76.
* McCune, 894 F.2d at 1113 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
100 See, e.g., Cox v. Acme Health Servs, Inc., 55 F.3d 1304, 1306 (7th Cir. 1995)
("Duties [of home health aides] may include the performance of simple procedures as
an extension of therapy services or nursing service, personal care, ambulation and
exercise, household services essential to health care at home, assistance with
medications that are ordinarily self-administered, reporting changes in the patient's
conditions and needs, and completing appropriate records.") (emphasis added); Cook,
212 F. App'x at 296 (stating that Plaintiff, a full-time direct care worker, performed
"simple physical therapy" as part of a "comprehensive Plan of Care") (emphasis
added).
101 A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493 (1945) (quoting President
Franklin D. Roosevelt, The President Recommends Legislation Establishing
Minimum Wages and Maximum Hours, Message to Congress (May 24, 1937), in 6
THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 214 (Samuel I.
Rosenman ed., 2009)).
102 See, e.g., Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392 (1960); A.H.
Phillips, Inc., 324 U.S. at 493; McCune, 894 F.2d at 1109.
10s A.H. Phillips, Inc., 324 U.S. at 493.
.04 McCune, 894 F.2d at 1113 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
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application of the trained personnel exception would bring more
low-wage workers into the scope of FLSA protection, consistent
with the legislative intent of the Act.
Finally, the courts' application of the trained personnel
exception reveals the logical inconsistency underscoring the
exemption: Home health aides working in domestic
employment-including those employed by third party
agencies-are not entitled to minimum wage and overtime pay
while "the same work performed by an aide in a nursing home is
unambiguously covered by" the FLSA.'0 This discrepancy
"ignores the rapidly changing realities of the contemporary
health care industry"06 and undermines the federal government's
policy favoring home care as a preferable alternative to
institutionalization. 0 7
B. The Third Party Rule and Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v.
Coke
Perhaps the most visibly litigated aspect of the
companionship exemption, the third party rule-which declares
that agency-employed home health aides are excluded from
FLSA protection-rests on the shaky foundation of conflicting
regulatory language. The DOL's "General Provisions" define the
statutory term "domestic service employment" as "[s]ervices of a
household nature performed by an employee in or about a private
home of the person by whom he [or she] is employed."'os Under
this first regulation-the crux of the Plaintiffs argument in
Coke-a home health aide employed by a third party agency
would not qualify as a domestic service employee for purposes of
the companionship exemption. In other words, agency-employed
home health aides would be entitled to minimum wage and
overtime pay, a status their formal employment relationship
would have garnered them prior to the 1974 amendments. A
second regulation, however, set forth in a subsection entitled
"Interpretations" states that exempt companionship workers
include those "who are employed by an employer or agency other
105 Hearing, supra note 12, at 33 (statement of Dorie Seavey).
10 McCune, 894 F.2d at 1113 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
10' See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
10 Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(a)(7)-1(a)(2) (as amended in 2006) (emphasis added).
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than the family or household using their services." 09 Under this
third party rule, home health aides who are employed by an
agency are within the scope of the companionship exemption,
despite the formal nature of their employment relationship. As
the Court noted in Coke, the DOL had on at least three separate
occasions attempted to reconcile the inconsistency by "changing
the regulation and narrowing the exemption in order to bring
[home health aides employed by third parties] within the scope of
the FLSA's wage and hour coverage.""o
Political turnover stymied attempts to reconcile the conflict
in favor of home health aides. Under outgoing President Clinton,
the DOL issued three proposals for a new definition of
companionship services intended to reduce the number of
employees excluded from FLSA wage and hour protection."' A
new definition was warranted, according to the DOL, as
"significant changes in the home care industry over the last
[twenty five] years, [have meant that] workers who today provide
in-home care ... are performing types of duties and working in
situations that were not envisioned when the companionship
services regulations were promulgated.""2 In 2002, however, the
Bush administration withdrew the proposed regulations, citing
concerns about increased costs of homecare."13  Ultimately, the
DOL made no changes, leaving the judiciary with the task of
ironing out the conflict.
Adding to the regulatory tangle is the fact that prior to the
DOL's enactment of the third party rule in 1975, home health
aides employed by third party agencies were unambiguously
protected by the FLSA under the "enterprise" coverage
provision." 4 The "enterprise" provision of the FLSA, added in the
1960s, extended minimum wage and overtime protections to
109 29 C.F.R. § 552.109(a) (2011); see Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke,
551 U.S. 158, 163 (2007).
n0 Coke, 551 U.S. at 163.
n' See Biklen, supra note 10, at 145-47. See generally Application of the Fair
Labor Standards Act to Domestic Service, 66 Fed. Reg. 5481, 5481-89 (Jan. 19,
2001) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 552). The DOL's three proposals are addressed later
in this note. See infra Part III.A.1.
112 Application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to Domestic Service, 66 Fed.
Reg. at 5481.
11 See Application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to Domestic Service, 67 Fed.
Reg. 16,668 (Apr. 8, 2002) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 552); see also Biklen, supra note
10, at 115, 145.
114 29 U.S.C. § 203(r), (s) (2006).
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individuals, including domestic service employees employed in an
"enterprise" of a certain size." As such, the enterprise coverage
provision kept agency-employed home health aides within the
scope of federal protection, even after the enactment of the
companionship exemption."' The DOL's 1975 third party rule,
however, interpreted the companionship exemption as
withdrawing coverage of such employees. 1 17 In other words, the
1975 rule operated to repeal enterprise coverage in the area of at-
home care, despite the size or profit margin of the employer. In
this way, the DOL shifted the focus of wage and hour laws from
the nature of the employer to the nature of the work
performed. 1 8 The current result of the DOL's action is that the
proliferation of large for-profit home health agencies, which
employ the majority of the nation's home health aides,"i9 are not
held to compliance with federal wage and hour laws. 2 0
Whether the DOL's third party rule was enforceable in light
of this long-standing conflict took center stage in Coke. 2' In
Coke, home health aide Evelyn Coke sued her agency-employer
claiming that "despite working more than [forty] hours a week
she never received overtime payments and that her hourly wage
was less [than] the minimum wage outlined in the FLSA."122 In
response, Long Island Care at Home argued that it was exempt
115 Id. To qualify as an "enterprise," an employer had to have annual gross sales
of at least $250,000. See id. § 203(s)(1); 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FAIR
LABOR STANDARDS AMENDMENTS OF 1966, at 2 (1968). The limit has since been
changed to $500,000. See § 203(s)(1)(A)(ii).
16 See Brief for the Urban Justice Center, supra note 32, at 4-5.
n1 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 4,
Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158 (2007) (No. 06-593). "After
receiving and considering comments on the proposed rule ... [the] DOL decided that
all third-party employment, without regard to the employer's status as a covered
enterprise, should be included within the scope of the companionship services
exemption." Id.; see also Application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to Domestic
Service, 40 Fed. Reg. 7405 (1975) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 552.3 (2010)).
118 See Brief for the Urban Justice Center, supra note 32, at 11 ("There simply is
no evidence of some freestanding authorization to exempt large, profit-making
employers whose economic activities are at the heartland of Congress's legislative
jurisdiction.").
119 "There are now almost 25,000 homecare agencies in the U.S., with almost
three-quarters being for-profit. For-profit companies employed [sixty-two percent] of
home health care aides as of 1999." Hearing, supra note 12, at 13-14 (statement of
Craig Becker, Associate General Counsel, Service Employees International Union).
120 See 29 C.F.R. § 552.109(a) (2010).
121 267 F. Supp. 2d 332 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
122 Id. at 334.
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from FLSA wage and hour requirements in light of the third
party rule because Ms. Coke fell within the companionship
exemption.
At issue throughout Coke's journey to the Supreme Court
were not the substantive merits of Ms. Coke's wage and hour
claims, but the degree of judicial deference to afford to the DOL's
interpretation of the companionship exemption. The Supreme
Court established the standard of judicial deference owed to
administrative agencies in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council.12' Chevron declared that when
Congress "has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is
an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a
specific provision of the statute by regulation."'2 4 In light of
Chevron, the district court held that the DOL's third party rule
was valid.'2 5 The Second Circuit posited, however, that some
agency regulations are entitled to less than Chevron deference,
namely where those regulations are interpretive, rather than
legislative.2 Where a regulation is merely interpretive, the
court explained, it is entitled to the lower-level deference
established in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.127 Under Skidmore, an
interpretation is not binding on courts, as it would be under
Chevron, but rather, should be looked to for its "power to
persuade."
Applying precedent to the regulations at hand, the Second
Circuit declared that the third-party rule was not a legislative
regulation entitled to full Chevron deference, but merely an
interpretive regulation entitled to lower-level Skidmore
deference.'29 Of particular, if perhaps obvious, significance to the
court was that the DOL published the rule among its
123 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
124 Id. at 843-44.
"2 See Coke, 267 F. Supp. 2d at 341.
126 See Coke v. Long Island Care at Home, Ltd., 376 F.3d 118, 131 (2d Cir. 2004)
("'[Iinterpretive rules .. . enjoy no Chevron status as a class.'") (second alteration in
original) (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 232 (2001)). The Court
noted that while all prior courts had granted the third party rule Chevron deference,
those decisions were post-dated by Mead, which called for a different analysis. See
id.
1 See id. at 133 (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944)).
128 Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140; see Coke, 376 F.3d at 133.
129 See Coke, 376 F.3d at 133.
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interpretations, rather than among other regulations holding the
force of law.3 0 Moreover, the court refuted the DOL's argument
that the third party rule "was promulgated after notice and
comment" and therefore within the proper exercise of the DOL's
rulemaking authority.''
Consistent with judicial treatment of an administrative
interpretation, the Second Circuit turned to an analysis of the
third party rule's "power to persuade" and subsequently declared
the rule to be unenforceable.132 To determine the interpretation's
persuasive value, the court examined several factors, including:
its "consisten[cy] with the congressional purpose," as well as "its
consistency with other regulations; the consistency of the
agency's position over time; the thoroughness evident in [the
agency's] consideration; and the validity of its reasoning. "133
Pointing out abounding inconsistencies for each of these factors,
the Second Circuit found the DOL's third party rule lacking.'34
The Supreme Court, however, reversed the Second Circuit,
holding that the third party rule was a valid and binding exercise
of the DOL's rulemaking authority entitled to full Chevron
deference.'3  The Court first acknowledged that the DOL's
regulations conflicted as to whether the companionship
130 See id. at 131. That the "DOL did not intend to use the legislative power
delegated in § 213(a)(15)," the companionship exemption, was "apparent from its
inclusion of the regulation under 'Subpart B-Interpretations' as opposed to 'Subpart
A-General Regulations.' "Id.
131 See id. at 132. "[T]he notice and comment procedure... was at best
idiosyncratic and at worst insufficient." Id.
132 See id. at 133-35. The Supreme Court vacated the court's decision and
remanded the case to "the Second Circuit for further consideration in light of the
[DOL's] Wage and Hour Advisory Memorandum No.2005-1 (December 1, 2005)."
Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 546 U.S. 1147, 1147 (2006). On remand the
Second Circuit "adhere[d] to [its] original position" that § 552.109(a) was
unenforceable. Coke v. Long Island Care at Home, Ltd., 462 F.3d 48, 50 (2006).
133 Coke, 376 F.3d at 133 (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
134 See id. at 133-35. Specifically, the Second Circuit found: (1) that it was
"implausible, to say the least, that Congress . .. would have wanted the DOL to
eliminate coverage for employees of third party employers who had previously been
covered"; (2) that the third party rule was "jarringly inconsistent" with the DOL's
other regulations; (3) that the agency itself had taken inconsistent positions with
regard to FLSA coverage over time; and (4) "the DOL's inadequate reasoning in
support of the regulation is matched by its failure to exhibit thoroughness in its
consideration." Id. at 133-34.
135 See Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 166-76 (2007).
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exemption applied to agency-employed home health aides.'3 6 To
determine which regulation controlled, the Court deferred to a
DOL Advisory Memorandum, which declared that the third party
regulation governed.137  Writing for the Court, Justice Breyer
offered several reasons for supporting the memorandum. First, a
decision to the contrary would create considerable practical
problems.'3 8 Second, because "normally the specific governs the
general" third party rule, as the more specific regulation with
regard to third party employment should control on that issue.'
Third, although the DOL has interpreted these regulations
differently throughout its history, it is unlikely that these
legislative changes have caused "unfair surprise." 40 Fourth, the
Court dismissed the notion that the Advisory Memorandum,
though written in response to the litigation, was "merely a post
hoc rationalizatio[n] ."'"4 Thus, the Court affirmed the third party
rule, effectively insulating it from future challenges by agency-
employed home health aides.'42
C. The Wake of Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke and the
Crisis in At-Home Care
Absent legislative action, the impossibility of successful
claims by agency-employed home health aides to FLSA wage and
hour protections under the Court's decision in Coke presents a
grave threat to the future of the home health care industry. As
one industry analyst declared, "[h]ome care workers are exiting
the job-and, as a result, the quality of care is suffering-because
of the job's poor working conditions, including low compensation
136 See id. at 169.
.. See id.
118 See id. For example, the Court states that if it were to decide that 29
C.F.R. § 552.3 controlled on the issue of third party employment, that is, that the
FLSA's domestic service provisions applied only to those persons employed in the
home of the employer, "that would place outside the scope of FLSA's wage and hour
rules any butlers, chauffeurs, and so forth who are employed by any third party." Id.
139 Id. at 170.
140 See id.
141 Id. at 171 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
142 Lower courts have since relied conclusively on the Court's holding in Coke.
See, e.g., Buckner v. Fla. Habilitation Network, Inc., 489 F.3d 1151, 1153 (11th Cir.
2007) ("[Pursuant to Coke,] a domestic service employee, employed by a third party
employer rather than directly by the family of the person receiving care, is exempt
from the overtime requirements of the FLSA . . . .").
2011] 857
858 ST. JOHNS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:837
levels."143 Indeed, high employee turnover rates in home health
care" pose problems not only for providers, who face
considerable direct and indirect staffing costs,145 but for states
seeking to effectuate federal rebalancing goals.146 Ultimately, the
loss of trained home health aides and the shortage of new aides
entering the field will mean that the increasing demand for home
aides will go unmet-a prospect long-term care providers are
calling a "crisis."147
Moreover, Congress's persistent exclusion of home health
aides under the companionship exemption recalls the economic
marginalization of women and minorities that proponents of the
1974 amendment sought to address. Home health care is largely
"women's work": Eighty-nine percent of home health aides are
female and more than half are minorities.14 8  And they remain
among the ranks of the health care industry's lowest paid.14 9
According to a recent tabulation by Forbes, the personal and
home care occupation qualifies as one of the twenty-five worst
143 SMITH, supra note 14, at 3. "For consumers, high turnover and understaffing
lead to inadequate and unsafe care, poorer quality of life, and reduced access to
services." WRIGHT, supra note 15, at 3.
144 "Some [eighty-six] percent of direct care workers turn over every year." 153
CONG. REC. 11,657 (2007) (statement of Sen. Harkin).
141 Estimates indicate that the average cost to replace a direct care worker
ranges from $4,200 to $5,200. Brief Amici Curiae of AARP and The Older Women's
League (OWL) in Support of Respondent at 13, Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v.
Coke, 551 U.S. 158 (2007) (No. 06-593). "Turnover may also entail important indirect
costs for providers, such as costs associated with lost productivity, reduced service
quality, and deterioration in employee morale. For workers, high turnover rates and
high workloads can mean increased risk of on-the-job injuries, more stress and
frustration, and less opportunity for training and mentoring, all of which can further
increase turnover." WRIGHT, supra note 15, at 3.
146 "In a 2003 survey of [forty-four] states,... [eighty percent] said that direct
care vacancies were a serious issue in their states." WRIGHT, supra note 15, at 2
(citing PARAPROFESSIONAL HEALTHCARE INSTITUTE & N.C. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., RESULTS OF THE 2003 NATIONAL SURVEY OF STATE INITIATIVES ON
THE LONG-TERM CARE DIRECT-CARE WORKFORCE (2004), available at http://www.
directcareclearinghouse.org/download/2003_NatSurveyState Initiatives.pdf).
1 See PARAPROFESSIONAL HEALTHCARE INSTITUTE, DIRECT-CARE HEALTH
WORKERS: THE UNNECESSARY CRISIS IN LONG-TERM CARE 6 (2001).
14 WRIGHT, supra note 15, at 1.
. In 2008, the DOL reported that the mean hourly wage for home health aides
was $10.31, and the mean annual wage $21,440. Compare with other health care
support positions: nursing aides, orderlies and attendants at $11.84 and $24,620;
psychiatric aides at $13.10 and $27,260; and massage therapists at $19.16 and
$39,850, respectively. Occupational Employment Statistics, BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, http://www.bls.gov/oes/2008/may/oes-nat.htm#
b31-0000 (last modified May 29, 2009).
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paid jobs in America, ranking just above cashiers and parking
attendants.5 o Additionally, most employers provide no
benefits. 5 1 "The degree to which this workforce struggles with
basic economic survival is further underscored by the fact that
nearly half... of all personal and home care aides live in
households that receive some kind of public assistance. . . ."152 In
fact, "[a] 2004 report by the Department of Health and Human
Services indicates that between thirty and thirty-five percent of
single-parent home health aides receive food stamps."5 3 Such a
result illustrates precisely the effect that Congress sought to
avoid when it indicated that the companionship exemption
should not be applied to "regular bread-winners [who are]
responsible for their families' support."15 4
In their June 2009 letter, Senator Harkin and his colleagues
aptly summarized the need for change and argued that the
Supreme Court's decision in Coke leaves the door open for the
DOL to change its interpretation under the Obama
administration. 15 5 The Senators are correct in writing that "[il t is
critical that these professional workers, who provide essential
services to our nation's elderly and disabled, have the same right
to minimum wage and overtime pay as enjoyed by other
workers."'"' The next section examines legislative possibilities
for extending FLSA protections to home health aides and posits
that, despite the Senators' recommendation, a congressional
amendment, rather than altered DOL regulations, would provide
the best vehicle by which to achieve this pivotal goal.
1"o Hearing, supra note 12, at 30 (statement of Dorie Seavey).
151 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL
OUTLOOK HANDBOOK: NURSING, PSYCHIATRIC, AND HOME HEALTH AIDES 444 (2008-
09 Library ed.) (2008).
152 Hearing, supra note 12, at 31 (statement of Dorie Seavey).
65 SMITH, supra note 14, at 3.
154 H.R. REP. No. 93-913, at 24 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2811,
2845, 1974 WL 11448.
6' See Letter from Tom Harkin, U.S. Sen., et al., to Hilda Solis, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't
of Labor (June 11, 2009) (on file with author), available at http://harkin.senate.gov/
press/release.cfm?i=314345.
1 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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III. BRINGING HOME HEALTH AIDES WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE
FLSA
A. Past and Present Legislative Proposals: An Examination and
Critique
1. Clinton-Era DOL Proposed Changes to the Definition of
Exempt Companionship Services
Though subsequently withdrawn, the DOL's three proposed
alternatives to the definition of companionship services remain
prevalent in legal and industry analysts' commentary as a
blueprint for future regulation."' All three proposals emphasize
"fellowship"-never precisely defined but suggestive of personal
interaction between the aide and patient-as a "critical
component"58  of the duties that would fall under the
companionship exemption. The three proposals then necessarily
call for an examination of a worker's allocation of time between
certain duties.'5 9
"Under the first proposal, the companionship
exemption ... [would apply to home health aides] if fellowship is
a 'significant part' of the worker's duties."6 0 While "this option
does not define what percentage of a worker's time spent on
fellowship qualifies as 'significant,' "1"1 it "anticipate [d] that
fellowship would occur in conjunction with the performance of
other intimate personal care chores, such as bathing, grooming,
and dressing, which also would constitute exempt duties."6 2 This
first option would also exempt household work related to the care
of the elderly or infirm client,'6 3 in line with Terwilliger and other
cases dealing with the general household work exception.164
The second proposal made the companionship exemption
applicable if fellowship is the "primary" duty of the worker, such
157 See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 14, at 5; see also Biklen, supra note 10, at 146-
47.
15 Application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to Domestic Service, 66 Fed.
Reg. 5481, 5484 (Jan. 19, 2001) (codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 552).
'e See id.
16o SMITH, supra note 14, at 5; see also Biklen, supra note 10, at 146-47.
161 SMITH, supra note 14, at 5.
162 See Application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to Domestic Service, 66 Fed.
Reg. at 5484.
I Id. at 5488; see also Biklen, supra note 10, at 147.
164 Terwilliger v. Home of Hope, Inc., 42 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1251 (N.D. Okla.
1999).
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that a worker "must spend at least [fifty percent] of his or her
weekly hours worked providing fellowship or protection" to be
exempt from the FLSA.165  While this second proposal is more
protective of employees than the first,166 it approximates the first
definition in that courts may find that fellowship activities exist
in conjunction with other non-fellowship activities. For example,
as one scholar noted, if a home health "aide chatted with the
client while vacuuming the room," the time spent vacuuming
would "count towards the fifty percent fellowship figure."1"'
Finally, a third proposal-one that would extend coverage to
the most significant number of home health aides-would limit
the companionship exemption to apply only if fellowship were the
core duty of the worker. Specifically, the third definition would
require a companion to spend at least eighty percent of his or her
time "exclusively providing fellowship or protection"168 in order to
be exempt from FLSA protection. Distinct from the former
proposals, the eighty percent fellowship requirement could not
include the performance of intimate tasks such as bathing,
grooming, or dressing. In other words, those activities would not
be exempt as they are not purely fellowship activities, which
include "reading a book or a newspaper to the person, [or]
chatting with him or her about family or other events."16 As
industry and legal commentators have noted, this third proposal
most closely aligns with congressional intent to exclude from
minimum wage and overtime pay protection only those persons
acting as occasional and informal companions 17 0 rather than
persons formally engaged in a vocation.
While the first and second proposals take a necessary step
toward extending FLSA protection to home health aides, they
compromise client care by linking compensation to the
impersonal nature of the interaction between an aide and client.
165 Application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to Domestic Service, 66 Fed.
Reg. at 5488.
166 Biklen, supra note 10, at 147.
167 Id. at 148; see Application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to Domestic
Service, 66 Fed. Reg. at 5488.
168 See Application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to Domestic Service, 66 Fed.
Reg. at 5488; Biklen, supra note 10, at 148; SMITH, supra note 14, at 5.
169 Application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to Domestic Service, 66 Fed.
Reg. at 5484.
170 See Biklen, supra note 10, at 137; SMITH, supra note 14, at 5; see also supra
Part I.B.2.
2011] 861
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
The first two proposals exempt from FLSA protection acts of
fellowship performed in conjunction with non-fellowship
activities-for example, conversing with a client while
vacuuming, as one scholar suggested,"' or even while assisting
with medical functions.172 As such, they risk incentivizing home
health aides to avoid engaging in friendly interaction with clients
while accomplishing household or medical tasks. Such a result
would negatively impact care by frustrating the formation of
amicable and therapeutic working relationships. This is
particularly troubling in light of the fact that for many
homebound seniors, a visiting home health aide may be one of
few, if not the only, regular sources of social interaction.173
Moreover, all three proposals would perhaps prove
unworkable in practice and promote more litigation. Like the
general household work exception, these alternate proposals
raise important record-keeping and supervisory issues. 17 4 Just as
it may be difficult for a trier of fact to discern the time per week
an aide spent on household work related to a client's care, such
as cleaning up spills, 1 75 for the purpose of the twenty percent
threshold, how would one accurately assess the amount of time
spent in fellowship versus non-fellowship activities for the
purposes of the DOL's proposals? Whether the exempted activity
is cleaning a spill or chatting, its impromptu nature defies the
kind of record keeping on which both of the exception DOL
proposals rely. Moreover, in the absence of accurate records,
litigation would be reduced to the home health aides' word
against that of her employer, often with only the client as a
witness to the amount of time his or her aide spent on various
activities.
171 Biklen, supra note 10, at 148.
172 Buckman, supra note 76.
171 See PARAPROFESSIONAL HEALTHCARE INSTITUTE, supra note 147.
174 With regard to the household work exception, Deborah Buckman advises that
"counsel should ensure that the employer has kept accurate and complete records,
which can provide essential evidence" in litigation. Buckman, supra note 76.
Because the "determination of whether household work falls into the [twenty
percent] category is a fact question dependent on the particular situation in each
case," without such record keeping, a court may not be able adequately rule on that
question. Id.
175 See McCune v. Or. Senior Servs. Div., 894 F.2d 1107, 1111 (9th Cir. 1990).
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2. The Fair Home Health Care Act
Although the Senators' letter asks the DOL to change its
interpretations of the companionship exemption,"' a formal
congressional amendment to the exemption, such as that offered
by the proposed Fair Home Health Care Act of 2007, is a
preferable legislative channel. As illustrated by the turnover
between the Clinton and Bush administrations, agency
regulations-including the DOL's regulations regarding the
companionship exemption-are subject to the political process
and are therefore imbued with a level of impermanence.us
Conversely, a congressional amendment presents a more stable
solution that is better suited to reinforcing federal rebalancing
goals for the longterm care industry.
The Fair Home Health Care Act, sponsored by Senator
Harkin, emphasizes the distinction between casual and non-
casual employment. The bill, known as H.R. 3582, "would extend
federal hour and wage laws to non-casual, non-live- in [sic]
homecare/personal assistance workers."'79  The bill does so
through the simple modification of the existing statutory
language of the companionship exemption. Specifically, where
the existing language exempts "any employee employed on a
casual basis .. . to provide babysitting services or any employee
employed . . . to provide companionship services,"18o the bill's
amended language exempts "any employee employed on a casual
basis ... to provide babysitting services or any employee
employed on a casual basis. . to provide companionship
services."118 "Casual basis" is further defined as employment
which "is irregular or intermittent, and is not performed by an
individual whose vocation is the provision or babysitting or
companionship services or an individual employed by an
employer or agency other than the family or household using such
176 See Letter from Tom Harkin, U.S. Sec., et al., to Hilda Solis, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't
of Labor (June 11, 2009) (on file with author), available at http://harkin.senate.gov/
press/release.cfn?i=314345.
" See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
.7. See Michael Asimow & Ronald M. Levin, STATE AND FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 278 (3d ed. 2009) (providing a discussion on "midnight
regulations").
" See Hearing, supra note 12, at 34 (statement of Dorie Seavey).
180 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(15) (2006).
181 The Fair Home Health Care Act, H.R. 3582, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007) (emphasis
added).
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services."82 By declaring that casual basis employment does not
apply to "an individual employed by an ... agency,"'a H.R. 3582
effectively disables the DOL's third party rule and reinstates the
protections that agency-employed home health aides enjoyed
under the FLSA's enterprise provision."s
B. Making the Fair Home Health Care Act a Viable and
Affordable Option
Despite its viability, the Fair Home Health Care Act does
not, on its face, respond to the long-standing argument against
the extension of wage protection to home health aides: increased
costs of, and reduced access to, home care. Concerns about
increasing the cost of at-home care have been cited as the
primary motive for excluding home health aides from the
FLSA.1'8 As one industry analyst stated, "the cost implications of
H.R. 3582 should be studied carefully ... [as] it is possible that
in some states, the costs could have significant budgetary and
service delivery implications that would require adjustments in
federal and state funding.""
While the concern about increased cost of care is a logical
one, it is easily addressed and does not warrant the denial of
FLSA protections for agency-employed home health aides. As
one industry analyst notes, "[ulnder-compensating labor in order
to keep the cost of services down creates a labor market
distortion that depresses the supply of labor . . ".' Moreover,
"cost-based concerns fail to consider the costs that will be saved
by reducing job turnover among home care workers."8 s
182 Id. (emphasis added).
183 Id.
1" See 29 U.S.C. § 203(r), (s) (2006).
... See McCune v. Or. Senior Servs. Div., 894 F.2d 1107, 1110 (9th Cir. 1990)
("[Miany private individuals, who do not benefit from federal and state assistance,
may also be forced to forego the option of receiving these services in their homes if
the cost of the services increases. The only alternative for these individuals may be
institutionalization.").
1" See Hearing, supra note 12, at 37-38 (statement of Dorie Seavey).
187 Id. at 38.
"I SMITH, supra note 14, at 3.
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One method for offsetting costs which has not yet been
proposed is a tax incentive aimed directly at employers"'9 who
will be mandated to comply with FLSA protections for agency-
employed home health aides under the Fair Home Health Care
Act.1 90 Such a tax credit would approximate existing federal
employer tax incentives, such as the Disabled Access Tax
Credit, 9 ' that offset an employer's cost of compliance with laws
aimed at protecting certain employees. The Disabled Access Tax
Credit reimburses eligible employers1 92 for expenditures 93 made
for the purpose of meeting the requirements of the Americans
with Disabilities Act.194 Similarly, a tax credit for home health
agencies of a certain size'95 would prevent increased operating
costs incurred through compliance with the Fair Home Health
Care Act from being unduly burdensome. Able to absorb the
expense of overtime pay, home health agencies would not be
forced to increase consumer costs to maintain profit margins.
Using the tax code to effectuate federal employment policy is
both a familiar and tested method. Two examples of business
related tax credits aimed at achieving policy goals are the Work
Opportunity Tax Credit ("WOTC")1'9 6 and the Empowerment Zone
Employment Credit ("EZEC").o'9 The WOTC credits employers
for each employee that falls within statutorily identified groups,
including ex-felons, social security income recipients, veterans,
and long-term family assistance recipients."' Similarly, the
EZEC provides that employers will receive a credit for wages
19 Dorie Seavey has proposed reimbursements aimed directly at individual
consumers: "To the extent that the true costs of care are beyond the reach of
consumers, then the more appropriate remedy is to use the tax code to give subsidies
to consumers or families that are burdened by these costs." Hearing, supra note 12,
at 38 (statement of Dorie Seavey).
I See The Fair Home Health Care Act, H.R. 3582, 110th Cong. (2007).
'9e 26 U.S.C. § 44 (2006).
192 See id. § 44(b).
13 See id. § 44(c)(1)-(2). "[Elligible access expenditures" include, but are not
limited to, expenses incurred for the purpose of removing "barriers which prevent a
business from being accessible to, or usable by, individuals with disabilities." Id.
§ 44(c)(2)(A).
194 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2006 & Supp. II).
"' The enterprise provision of the FLSA arguably provides a guideline for
designating home health agencies earning $500,000 per year as those subject to the
Fair Home Health Care Act and an accompanying tax incentive. See supra notes
113-14 and accompanying text.
196 26 U.S.C.A. § 51 (West 2011).
197 26 U.S.C. § 1396 (2006).
198 See 26 U.S.C.A. § 51(d)(1)(A)-(I) (West 2011).
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paid to each "qualified zone employee," that is, an employee who
lives and works in a government designated "empowerment
zone."'99 In both cases, Congress has used tax cuts tied directly
to employee wages to incentivize employers to hire individuals
from targeted groups for the purpose of increasing employment
opportunities for underrepresented individuals.
Despite inherent differences between a business tax
incentive like the WOTC and one potentially accompanying the
Fair Home Health Care Act, the WOTC provides a workable
model by which Congress may design a tax incentive in the
context of agency-based home health care. Admittedly, the
WOTC is a short-term incentive: The credit is set at forty
percent of a target-group employee's first-year wages, not to
exceed $6,000.200 In contrast, however, a home health agency tax
incentive should extend into the length of the employee's tenure
in order to mitigate continued overtime pay expenses. Despite
this distinction, the agency-based incentive could approximate
the WOTC by crediting a significant percentage of expenditures
for overtime payments.2 0 ' Adding to this credit, home health
agencies would also see reduced turnover costs, as compensation
would appropriately reflect the number of hours worked. With
this dual benefit, the Fair Home Health Care Act is both an
affordable option and one that provides solid reinforcement of the
government's stated support of home health care as a long-term
care option for older Americans.
Finally, the Fair Home Health Care Act's guarantee of FLSA
protections for agency-employed home health aides, coupled with
a tax incentive for agency employers, may have the added
benefits of stabilizing the home care industry by promoting third
party employment, rather than independent "off-the-books"
employment, and attracting new, qualified individuals to the
home health care field.
.. See 26 U.S.C. § 1396(d)(1)(A)-(B) (2006).
200 26 U.S.C.A. § 51(a)-(b)(3) (West 2011).
201 It is beyond the scope of this Note to determine the precise mechanics of the
tax incentive proposed. Rather, it should be left to the legislature to determine the
percentage of wages to be credited each year, based on empirical analyses of home
health agencies' increased wage expenditures.
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CONCLUSION
With the number of elderly people in the United States
growing more rapidly than ever before, the need for long-term
care services is at its zenith. Within the long-term care industry,
home care has been promoted through the federal government's
rebalancing policy as a preferable alternative to
institutionalization. While home health aides make home care
possible, federal law continues to deny them the same pay and
overtime protections guaranteed to other health care workers,
domestic employees, and full-time babysitters. Although agency-
employed home health aides are certainly not the casual "elder
sitters" Congress intended to exclude from FLSA protections
when it enacted the "companionship exemption," the DOL's
interpretations of the exemption have kept these professional
workers-mostly women who are minorities and often heads of
households-relegated to a position of financial dependence.
With the DOL's third-party rule upheld by the Supreme
Court in Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, agency-
employed home health aides have effectively been foreclosed from
seeking redress for unfair labor conditions in the federal court
system. As such, legislative action is necessary to secure wage
and hour protections for home health aides and stem the tide of
employee turnover that poses a crisis to the future of the home
health industry. While the DOL has previously proposed new
definitions of "companionship" to narrow the exemption, the
proposals' unworkable standards may only add to the abundance
of litigation surrounding the FLSA.
The Fair Home Health Care Act offers the best solution for
extending FLSA protections to America's home health aides. By
revising the language of the "companionship exemption" such
that the exemption applies only to those domestic workers
employed on a "casual basis"-less than twenty hours per week
and not by a third party agency-the Fair Home Health Care Act
brings the exempt "companion" into alignment with the
Congress's intent. Moreover, the Act ensures as, Franklin
Delano Roosevelt declared as the purpose of the FLSA, that "all
our able-bodied working men and women [earn] a fair day's pay
for a fair day's work."202 For home health aides like Evelyn Coke,
202 A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493 (1945) (quoting President
Franklin D. Roosevelt, The President Recommends Legislation Establishing
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who at 74 was unable to afford an aide of her own while suffering
from kidney disease2 03-the alternative is simply not an option.
Making the Fair Home Health Care Act a viable option is
possible with an accompanying tax incentive to third party home
health agencies. Such a tax incentive will enable agencies to
absorb the costs compliance with FLSA wage and hour laws
without projecting those costs onto consumers and the Medicare
system. Much like other business related tax credits already
enacted in furtherance of federal employment policies, a tax
incentive for home health agencies will support, rather than
undermine, the expansion of quality, affordable, at-home senior
care.
Minimum Wages and Maximum Hours, Message to Congress (May 24, 1937), in 6
THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 210 (Samuel I.
Rosenman ed., 2009)).
2os Martin, supra note 3.
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